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ABSTitACT 
Bureaucracy is a traditional object of disparaging commentary, 
but in recent years it has received more than a proportionate share of 
popular and political criticism. Perceived problems of wasteful, 
unresponsive, power-hungry, and out-of-control bureaucracy have 
generated calls for across the board cut-backs in bureaucratic size 
and authority, as well as for various structural reforms designed to 
limit the activities of what is left after the prun ing. This paper 
argues that much criticism of American bureaucracy is misplaced, and 
that attempts at structural tinkering are therefore doomed to fail. 
Too many critics of contemporary bureaucracy fail to understand that 
deeper political (usually Congressional) failures are the basic causes 
and bureaucratic failures often only symptoms. The single-member 
district electoral system, re-election seeking Congressmen! and the 
Congressional division of labor combine to produce a system in which 
apparent bureaucratic failures emerge as a by-product of efforts to 
generate political support. Structural reforms may be useful to 
contemplate, but they should address electoral and Congressional 
structures as well as if not more so than bureaucratic structures. 
BUREAUCRATIC (?) FAILURES: CAUSES AND CURES 
Morris P. Fiorina 
INTRODUCTION 
Only a decade ago flagellating the federal bureaucracy was primarily a 
conservative Republican solidarity rite. Today representatives of every 
political persuasion are fighting over the whip. In the mid-60's the country 
elected a Democratic president committed to a federally built Great Society. 
In the mid-1970's the country elected a Democratic president who claimed that 
he was not then nor had ever been a part of the federal establishment. In 
1980 the citizenry rejected that Democratic president in favor of a Republican 
who explicitly promised to get government off their backs. 
Political leadership in the United States usually reduces to the 
ability to discern which way the tide is flowing and avoid inundation by it. 
The Republican party in 1980 found itself well-situated to catch the wave, 
though we may debate whether this reflects Republican acumen - - even 
persuasion -- or merely forty-odd years of political habit. Meanwhile, some 
Democrats paddle furiously to overtake the crest (e.g. Sen. Tsongas), while 
others tread the backwater in the hope that the tide will soon reverse (e.g. 
Sen. Kennedy).! The waves have been forming for some time, but we should be 
cautious in attempting to pinpoint their source. For every rightward trend in 
public opinion data there exists seemingly related data which show no trend or 
even a touch of leftward movement. 2 There is little evidence of any general 
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conservative mandate -- the American people are not in the habit of granting 
mandates, they lean more towards probation. 3 And a real igning election? Oh, 
there have been two or three in American history, but those who dwell on such 
things should reread ''The Boy Who Cried Wolf. " 
What public opinion data over the past two decades do show is a rather 
steady and large-scal e disillusionment with the operation of American 
government. There is little or no desire to el iminate major federal 
commitments (with the exception of fo�eign aid). 4 Nor does the public
massively reject government regulation. 5 What the public has increasingl y
come to reject is the� in which programs are designed, implemented and 
administered. For example, since 1958 the Center for Political Studies of the 
University of Michigan has asked repeatedly in its el ection studies ''Do you 
think people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste 
some of it, or don't waste very much of it?'' Between 1958 and 1978 the 
proportion of the population giving the answer ''waste a l ot of it'' increased 
from a minority of 43 percent to an overwhelming majority of 77 percent. 
During the same period CPS has asked ''Do you feel that almost all of the 
people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are 
doing?'' Over the twenty year period the proportion of the population 
choosing the ''don't know what they're doing'' response increased from 37 
percent to 51 percent. The literature abounds with similar indications of 
loss of confidence in government institutions and their operation, though not 
with the basic idea of a significant government role in the economy and 
society. 
The growing unhappiness with the operation of government should come 
as no surprise. By any standard government's impact on the citizen has 
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increased significantly during the past generation. Not only does the public 
sector now take a considerabl y larger share of national income and employ a 
l arger fraction of the work force, but the regulatory process impinges on a 
much broader range ot ordinary activities. Other things equal the average 
citizen now has a much higher probability of experiencing a real or perceived 
infringement ot his or her activities than was the case a generation ago. 
Moreover, over and above their personal experiences citizens are deluged with 
information about government failures, chiefly those involving the 
bureaucracy. Senator Proxmire bestows his Golden Fleece amid much fanfare, 
Ralph Nader and other watchdogs level their charges in press releases and at 
public hearings, investigative reporters publish their exposes of government 
wrongdoing and/or incompetence. And all of this eventually finds its way 
into the media. In recent years the informed citizen would have come across 
the following disturbing examples of bureaucratic irresponsibility and/or 
excess, as well as innumerable others similar to them. 
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Exhibit 1: Wasteful Bureaucrats 
If Ronald Reagan becomes President and wants to curtail waste in 
government spending, he would probably do well to dampen the Christmas spirit 
that seems to sweep the federal bureaucracy each September -- the last month 
of Uncle Sam's fiscal year. On September 29, 1978, for example, the Pentagon 
spread $187,631 worth of holiday cheer when it contacted for construction work 
on a base that the Army had already decided to close. About the same time, 
civil servants at the Youth Conservation Corps were on a last-minute spending 
spree to obtain 1,000 pairs of riding chaps, 4 ,000 pairs of glove and 181 
chain saws for a YCC camp with only 300 enrollees • • • •
In July a Senate subcommittee completed an eleven-month study of 
eleventh-hour spending and concluded that wasteful purchases total at least $2 
billion a year. The panel found that the last-minute spending rush resulted 
in ''the purchase of millions of dollars of goods and services for which there 
is not current need. " 
Although Federal purchasing agents are well aware that haste makes 
waste, they of ten face intense pressure from their bosses to accelerate 
spending. Joseph Pate, a former procurement officer of the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration, says that efforts to halt two especially wasteful 
year-end contracts were actively discouraged • • • •  Following his testimony, 
Pate found his staff cut and his office moved three times. 
(Excerpted from Harry Anderson, ''Again, a Federal Splurge, Newsweek 
September 22, 1980, p. 71). 
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Exhibit 2: Deceptive Bureaucrats 
Despite official statistics that place its civilian work force at 
nearly 2. 9 million people, the number of people who are paid with federal 
funds actually is more than 7 million • • • • 
Not only are hundreds of thousands of workers employed by government­
crea ted agencies and programs excluded from the Civil Service Commission's 
monthly statistics, but so are millions of ''outside'' workers who labor full 
time and part time for the government under a variety of contracts and grants. 
''The pressure is to keep the number as low as possible," one top 
commission official said • •
• •
The Department of Health, Education. and Welfare employs about 145,000 
people inside its agencies. But on the outside, HEW pays the salaries of 
980,000 other people in state and local governments, universities, research 
institutions and private contractors. 
During a Senate appropriations subcommittee hearing at which Califano 
presented his figures, a surprised Chairman Warren Magnuson (D. Wash. ) blurted 
out, ''This is the best public service job program I have ever heard of. 
That is more than we've given them for public service jobs. " Senator Ernest 
F. Hollings (D. s.c.), adding HEW's counted 146,000 employees to Califano's 
figures, exclaimed, ''My God, we are over 1 million. " 
In recent years officials have responded to critics of big government 
by maintaining that the federal work force has remained largely stable despite 
the rapid growth of the federal budget • • • •
However, in this same period the number of state and local employees 
tripled • • •  as a result of the growth in federal programs. 
(Excerpted from Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1979, Part VII, p. 8) 
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Exhibit 3: Disingenuous Bureaucrats 
New bonus programs for federal employees are helping some top-level 
bureaucrats get pay increases far above the ceiling imposed by Congress 
( $50, 112--MF) • • • • 
About 50 of those bureaucrats • • • received almost $70, 000 each in 
compensation from the taxpayers this year. Hundreds more received in excess 
of $60, 000, thanks to the programs established in the Civil Service Reform Act 
of 1978, now starting to take effect. 
At NASA, one of the first agencies to start its bonus program, more 
than half of its 427 career senior executives were pushed over the pay cap by 
awards ranging from $2, 000 to $20, 000 each • • • •
It was all done in accordance with the law and with governmental 
personnel regulations. Congress clearly authorized the largess in the 1978 
legislation, hoping to promote government productivity • • • • NASA personnel 
director Carl Grant said he feels the agency has been unfairly criticized by 
Congress. 
''NASA fully complied with the law • •
• •  
What [Congress] intended, 
apparently, was that only the
,
;reme de la creme would receive bonuses, but 
that is not what the law says • • • •  
Asked whether its hefty bo�us,
� ystem was viewed as a way around the 
Congressional cap, NASA's Grant said of course not. " 
Rep. Gladys Spellman, D-Md., disagreed. ''There is no question in my 
mind that a good many of [the bonuses] are being used to get around the pay 
cap, said the Congresswoman • • • •
Spellman said some bonuses are being used by high level ''cliques'' 
that plan to distribute the annual awards among themselves on a rotating 
basis. 
(Excerpted from Alan Murray ''Top Level Federal Workers Get Raises 
Despite Pay Cap, '' Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 
19, 1980, pp. 3164-3165). 
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Exhibit 4: Crooked Bureaucrats 
Evidence of massive fraud and abuse in the operations of the General 
Services Administration (GSA) continued to unfold during hearings September 
18-19 held by the Senate Governmental Affairs Federal Spending Practices 
Subconunittee. 
Elmer B. Staats, comptroller general and head of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), presented the results of a GAO study suggesting that 
similar problems existed in other federal agencies • • • •
Investigators have discovered a wide variety of fraud and abuse in 
GSA, including false claims for benefits and services, collusion among 
contractors and bribery of officials • • • •
Investigators are also looking at possible abuses in the awarding of 
large contracts and large-scale employee misuse of gasoline credit cards • • • •
Staats cited Justice Department estimates that up to $25 billion of 
the $250 billion the government spends annually in federal assistance programs 
may be lost through fraud or abuse. 
(Excerpted from Bob Livernash, ''GSA Corruption Outlined at Senate Hearing, '' 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 23, 1978, p. 2578. ) 
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Exhibit 5: Paternalistic Bureaucrats 
On October 1 a new regulation of the Environmental Protection Agency 
came into effect. It mandates a certain level of permissible noise on the 
part ot compacting garbage trucks. The regulation arises from the Noise 
Control Act of 1972, as amended by the Quiet Communities Act of 1978 • • • •
In retrospect, the two pieces of legislation may be seen as classic 
examples of federal expansion at the expense of state and local 
responsibilities. The 1972 law had a grand purpose and a large verb. The act 
was to free people from noise that ''jeopardizes health and welfare'' • • • •
The act gave the EPA broad powers to regulate ''major sources'' of noise. 
Now, it would seem to many of us, perhaps, that a garbage truck does 
not truly jeopardize or imperil public health • • • •
Nevertheless, the EPA conjured up some impressive statistics. The 
agency solemnly found that 19,650,000 persons are regularly exposed to 
excess ive noise levels because of the refuse vehicles. Federal regulation, it 
was concluded, would reduce that number to 6 million persons by 1991. Cities 
could not be trusted to deal with this peril by local ordinance. After all, 
the sleep of 13. 8 million persons was being disturbed nightly. Only the 
federal government could protect our repose • • • • 
Costs and benefits to one side, this petty, stupid, nit-picking 
regulation based almost entirely on gauzy conjecture as to ''sleep and 
activity interference'' offers one more instance of a bureaucracy that has 
gone beserk. 
(Excerpted from James Kilpatrick, ''80-Decibel Bureaucracy: Pages and 
Pages of Garbage, " Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1980. 
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Exhibit 6: Crazy(?) Perverse(?) Captive(?) Bureaucrats, or What Are Those 
People Doing? 
Most travelers who want to go between Olympia and Chehalis, two towns 
in western Washington, drive 21 miles along Interstate 5. 
Truck drivers for Puget Sound Truck Lines do, too -- but the 
Interstate Connnerce Commission contends they are violating the law. 
The ICC, which maintains rules regulating what truckers carry and what 
routes they follow, has told Puget Sound Truck Lines that its drivers may 
travel between Olympia and Chehalis only through Aberdeen, another city on 
Washington's coast. 
That is 120 miles -- 99 more than the direct route • • • •
The route problem originated in the late 1960's, after Puget Sound 
Truck Lines purchased another company, South Bend Transfer. 
Puget Sound had ICC authority to carry goods between Seattle, Olympia 
and Aberdeen. South Bend had been licensed to haul between Aberdeen, 
Chehalis, and Portland. The company ''tacked," or joined, the two routes. 
Puget Sound now had a potentially lucrative route between two major 
markets -- Seattle and Portland, Oregon -- and it set out to reduce gasoline 
consumption and to save time and money by using the direct route -- 180 miles 
entirely along Interstate 5. Competing truckers, who would have an advantage 
over Puget Sound if that company had to drive along the wayward route, 
complained to the ICC. The case went to court -- 5 years ago. 
(Excerpted from Bruce Johansen, ''Keep on Truckin', " Heavy Duty Trucking 
Magazine) 
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After persistent exposure to reports like the preceding, is it any 
wonder that the average citizen decides that ''a lot '' of his tax money is 
wasted by officials who ''don't know what they're doing? '' (Or worse yet, by 
officials who know exactly what they're doing -- robbing himl) I think not, 
but I also think that a critical question of our time is whether that average 
citizen eventually comes to believe that a lot of his tax money is wasted in 
government activities which are in principle doomed to failure. Such an 
eventuality becomes more probable the longer the stream of government failures 
to which the citizen is exposed. And while libertarians may gleefully 
anticipate a future era in which citizens have lost all belief in the efficacy 
of government action,6 they should consider that the alternative to the social 
democratic state is not necessarily the exchange economy of the optimistic 
individualist philosophers. Rather, the alternative instruments of resource 
allocation might just as well be the club and the gun of pessimistic 
Hobbesians. 
The point ot view in this paper is reformist rather than 
revolutionary. Exhibits like the six presented should arouse curiosity, not 
outrage. Why do so many bureaucratic failures exist, and what can be done 
about them? The jumping off point for the discussion is the observation that 
the exhibits presented and the myriad others which could be cited are not 
simply specific manifestations of a single general phenomenon called 
bureaucratic failure. It is important to recognize that there are numerous 
varieties of bureaucratic failure, that they have different primary sources, 
and that they require different r€J�edics. In particular, while the varieties 
illustrated in Exhibits (1) and (4) -- wasteful and crooked bureaucrats � 
undoubtedly cost billions of dollars and are perhaps the most visible and 
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outrageous to the citizenry, they are probably the most straightforward to 
diagnose and cure. Bureaucratic failures such as those illustrated in 
Exhibits (2), (3), (5) and (6) are undoubtedly more costly, more complex, and 
more difficult to deal with. For these failures are not primarily 
bureaucratic failures; rather, they are aspects of more general political 
failures. And it is these which most threaten the well-being of the country. 
BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE: AN OVERVIEW 
The concept of bureaucratic failure presumes a particular viewpoint on 
the part of the analyst � a public interest, or general interest viewpoint. 
Since these terms submit to no very precise formulation, I will propose a 
simple working definition of bureaucratic failure. If an ideologically mixed 
bag of observers consensually reject or condemn a bureaucratic rule, practice, 
decision, or other behavior when the latter is described in the abstract (i. e. 
without identifying whether the bureaucracy is HHS or DOD), then we have a 
good candidate for the category of bureaucratic failure. 
Varieties of Bureaucratic Failure 
Most instances ot bureaucratic failure fall into two broad classes. 
The first class includes those practices which conflict with widely accepted 
notions of good government. Exhibit (1) which illustrates waste and 
extravagance falls into this category, as does Exhibit (4) which illustrates 
good old-fashioned graft. Generally speaking this class of bureaucratic 
failures contains those more easily and non-controversially identified, and 
more remediable than those of the second class. Graft eventually will out, 
and indictments will result. Waste is frequently exposed, and while 
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procedural tinkering is no panacea it can alleviate the worst cases. 7 In
addition, the bright light of public exposure and the resulting political 
pressure usually has at least a temporary salutary effect. 
The second class of bureaucratic failures consists of those practices 
and activities which conflict with the explicit goals of the authorizing 
legislation and/or the legislative intent behind the legislation. Exhibit (2) 
details a widely used means of evading explicit employment ceilings. Exhibit 
(3) reports an apparent deflection of the intent of Congress: The NASA 
official admits that his department has not administered the program as 
intended, but maintains that no law has been violated. And Exhibit (6) 
describes an apparent bureaucratic perversion of the intent of the authorizing 
legislation. 
Some instances of the second class are as easily identified and non­
controversial as those of the first. Congress took action to alter the 
executive bonus situation (Exhibit 3) which clearly violated the intent of the 
original law. Other instances create greater difficulty. The goals of the 
authorizing legislation may be rather vaguely stated, an important element in 
Lowi's indictment of American government. 8 If so, inconsistency with the 
authorizing legislation is something that lies in the eye of the beholder. 
Mr. Kilpatrick most emphatically rejects the finding that the noise of garbage 
compactors ''jeopardizes health and welfare. " Others may disagree and offer 
plausible reasons why the matter should not be left to local ordinance. 
Sometimes legislative goals may actually be contradictory, in which case the 
bureaucracy is condemned to act in a manner partially inconsistent with 
legislative intent. This has been a charge commonly leveled at legislation in 
the area of economic regulation. 9 Perhaps most seriously, we may observe 
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bureaucratic activity openly acknowledged as inconsistent with the intent of 
Congress as a whole, but activity consistent with the desire of a segment of 
Congress holding particular importance for the relevant agency. Such cases 
move us out ot the area of bureaucratic failure and into the area of more 
broadly defined political failure. 
Sources of Bureaucratic Failure 
As the preceding discussion suggests, different types of bureaucratic 
failure draw sustenance from different sources. Any exploration of the wide­
ranging ''literature'' on bureaucracy will uncover at least three general 
explanations for the failures bureaucracies exhibit. The first, the Imperfect 
Bureaucrat explanation, focuses on the personal qualities and characteristics 
of bureaucrats. This explanation has two variants. The more extreme, or Evil 
Bureaucrat variant crops up frequently in popular commentary and in material 
published by various citizen's groups. Nader's organization, for example, 
of ten seems to suggest that government is rife with material corruption. In 
addition to outright bribery charges (e. g. Exhibit 4) there are numerous 
intimations ot technically legal but morally corrupt behavior -- acceptance 
of material favors, incestuous ties among present government employees, 
previous government employees, and future private employers, and conflicts of 
interest (e. g. Exhibit 3) . This variant holds that bureaucrats are too often 
not as good as the rest of us. 
The less extreme variant of the Imperfect Bureaucrat explanation might 
be termed the Insufficiently Dedicated Bureaucrat. I associate this position 
with the late Senator Hubert Humphrey. According to this variant bureaucrats 
lead harder lives than most. Material rewards are poor, public opprobrium is 
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common, and even private satisfaction in a job well done is problematic since 
the nature of the enterprise makes one's individual contribution hard to 
trace. If the Evil Bureaucrat variant holds that bureaucrats are not as good 
as the rest of us, the Insufficiently Dedicated variant holds that they must 
be better than the rest of us, but they aren't. 
Imperfect Bureaucrat views seldom_ appear in the academic literature, 
for social science favors explanations which treat political actors as no 
better or worse than anyone else. Thus, the roots of bureaucratic failure are 
not sought in hwnan imperfection, but in more general conditions which lead 
ordinary humans to behave ''imperfectly''. A now dated explanation might be 
called the ''Structural'' view. This view focuses on badly designed 
governmental organizations. In the older literature in public administration 
one finds condemnations of duplications of effort, overlapping jusrisdictions, 
blurred lines of responsibility, lack of central control, and so forth. In 
essence, if the bureaucracy, were organized according to what were perceived 
as sound business principles, bureaucratic failure could largely be overcome. 
This view, however, is now passe, and has given way to more sophisticated 
views which place incentives in the forefront. 
The third view of bureaucratic failure is an umbrella explanation, 
variants ot which appear in the literatures of the several disciplines which 
address the subject of bureaucracy. I can think of no completely satisfactory 
term, but for lack of anything better let us call the third view the 
Discrepant Incentives explanation. In general this explanation focuses on the 
slippage between how the ideal bureaucracy functions in the ideal and how real 
bureaucracies function in the here and now. The source of the slippage is 
located in the discrepant incentives faced by those who people the 
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bureaucracy. These individuals often face little or no incentive to behave in 
a manner consistent with the ideal account. Thus, economists assume that 
bureaucrats are no worse than the rest of us, but in fact, just l ike the rest 
of us -- self-serving. Outright illegality is no great (theoretical) problem; 
when uncovered it is punished in the private and public sector alike. But 
whereas the private sector turns self-serving behavior to societal advantage 
through the hidden hand of the market, the public sector produces no such 
happy outcome. The bureaucrats' personal rewards are only remotely connected 
to the public costs and benefits of the bureau's activities. Only if public 
sector actors were to behave in an other-serving manner would they produce 
favorable societal outcomes (if then), and they have no more incentive to 
behave in such fashion than the rest of us. 
While at first glance the preceding formulation might seem worlds away 
from sociological fonnulations, the difference is more one of detail than of 
fundamental perspective. According to sociologists and other organization 
theorists, continuing formal organizations have ''organizational goals'' chief 
among which is survival. Thus, bureaus develop practices and procedures 
designed to maintain organizational health. Unfortunately, these procedures 
and practices may not contribute to and may even detract from the 
accomplishinent of the formal missions bestowed upon the bureau by the law. 
Again the discrepancy: individual bureaucrats can personally lose a good deal 
by neglecting standard operating procedures in pursuit of public policy 
mandates whose costs and benefits are far removed from them personally. The 
literatures in modern political science and public administration which deals 
with policy failure draw heavily on this basic sociological formulation. lo
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Thus, scholars as disparate as economists and sociologists are in 
general agreement on the root cause of bureaucratic failures: individual 
bureaucrats face incentives which are unrelated to if not incompatible with 
the efficient and faithful implementation and administration of the law. To 
be sure major differences appear once we move beyond this general position. 
Sociologists place more weight on intangible goals (e. g. status, peer 
approval) relative to material rewards than do economists. The literatures 
differ too on the subject of intentionality. Sociologists speak of the 
''internal dynamics of organizations'' as if these had an existence at least 
partially independent of the individuals in the organization. Happenstance 
and history also play a nontrivial role in sociological analysis. In 
contrast, economists emphasize the conscious pursuit of goals (if not 
conspiracy) . To take an extreme example, George Stigler says in essence that 
only naive academics believe that the general interest ideal should bear any 
relation to the special interest reality of economic regulation, that the 
regulatory process is of, by, and for the regulatees, and that the high-minded 
sentiments of the authorizing legislation were purely symbolic and were known 
to be at the time.11 The literatures also differ greatly in their treatment 
of institutions. Much of the economic literature models the pursuit of 
private interests through a relatively undifferentiated political process. 
The sociological literature places greater emphasis on institutional forms. 
The political science literature and to some extent the public choice 
literature also pay heed to institutions. 12 The latter can shape incentives,
or at least the behavior by which individuals pursue their ends, though the 
public choice literature, in particular, recognizes that institutions 
themselves, especially informal ones such as ''norms'' and ''standard 
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operating procedures'' are the reflections of incentives faced by those who 
originated them. 13 In this view, private incentives affect both the structure 
and activity of the bureaucratic process. 
Insofar as we are concerned with the redress of bureaucratic failures, 
differences like the preceding are of major importance. From the standpoint 
of the institutionally sparse model of Stigler, one type of proposal for 
reform of the regulatory process might naturally arise. From the standpoint 
of the institutionally richer model of a William Niskanen, another type of 
reform might seem more obvious. And from the standpoint of the socially rich 
model of the sociologists yet another variety of reform might appear 
appropriate. 
In order to make any claims about the likely efficacy of structural 
reforms now in the air, let alone propose any new ones, we must ascertain 
whether such reforms will get at the root of the problem -- the inconsistent 
incentives facing those involved in bureaucratic failures. Thus, in the next 
section I consider in greater depth the incentive problems thought to underlay 
the kinds of bureaucratic failures illustrated in Exhibits (1) to (6) . .MI 
principle theme is that many of these incentive problems originate in 
Congress, or more broadly. the American electoral system, Thus, properly 
speaking, they are not bureaucratic failures at all. but Congressional 
failures. In the last section of the paper I will discuss the poor prospects 
for structural reform in light of the discussion of Congressional failures, 
BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE: A CLOSER LOOK 
Some pages ago I proposed a working definition of bureaucratic failure 
as the consensual judgment that a bureau or agency is not accomplishing its 
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manifest goals as efficiently as possible. After considering possible 
explanations for bureaucratic failure I settled on that which identifies 
insufficient incentives for bureaucrats to carry out efficiently the manifest 
goals of the bureau, and/or the existence of strong incentives to behave in a 
man ner inconsistent with the efficient pursuit of the bureau's manifest goals. 
Let us now take a closer look at these various and sundry incentives. 
The Standard Analysis 
Economists long ago pointed out the differences between the incentive 
structure faced by private sector providers of private goods and public sector 
providers ot public goods. Bureaus and agencies are not prof it making 
entities. Thus, their performance is not judged by the usual private sector 
standards. Indeed, for many agencies it is difficult to make even rough 
estimates of the overall benefits and costs of their activities. How are 
public goods like national security and wilderness preservation to be valued? 
And while the direct costs of bureaucracy might be tabulated fairly easily, 
the indirect costs are another matter.14 
As a result of the preceding fundamental differences the standard 
analysis continues, bureaucratic managers' rewards are not based on the 
''bottom line." Their remuneration consists of a fixed salary which is for 
all practical purposes guaranteed regardless of the performance -- however 
roughly evaluated -- of their agency or bureau. These managers have little 
personal material incentive to avoid inefficient operations since they can not 
appropriate any of the savings more efficient operations might produce. In 
fact, the standard analysis continues, matters are probably worse. Public 
sector managers' rewards (tangible such as salary and perks and intangible 
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such as status and power) covary with the size (employment and budget) and 
importance (i.e. power) of the agencies. Thus, there are positive incentives 
to increase agency work forces, budgets and missions. Not only is there no 
incentive to operate efficiently, there are compelling incentives to operate 
inefficiently. 
The standard analysis regards other ''bureaucratic'' characteristics 
as derivatives of the perverse incentive structure just described. 
Buckpassing? Why stick your neck out? A bold decision which proves well­
advised will gain little more than a pat on the back, whereas one which proves 
ill-advised may have real costs in terms of promotion prospects (and 
occasionally in terms of perks) . Similarly, detailed rules and excessive 
adherence thereto reflect the determination to cover one's flanks. In general 
the ''conservatism'' of bureaucracy is attributed to the lack of positive 
incentive for initiative vis-a-vis the lack of negative incentive for risk­
minimization and avoidance of responsibility. And, of course, the standard 
analysis recognizes that self-selection may reinforce the asyumetry of 
incentives. Those individuals who lack initiative and thrive in highly 
structured settings may be disproportionately attracted to and successful in 
bureaucracies. 
The standard analysis undoubtedly captures a part of the explanation 
of bureaucratic failure in the U.S. federal government (e.g. parts of Exhibits 
1-4) . But there are certain questions it fails to illuminate. Most 
obviously, why do bureaucrats ever take bold, controversial actions? Why did 
the FTC provoke the 96th Congress into legislative retaliation? Even if such 
cases are dismissed as deviant, other questions remain. If internal 
bureaucratic incentives are all wrong, why not change them? It is not 
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sufficient to mention Civil Service; the law could be changed. And even if it 
were not, why should the federal government rely so heavily on service­
providing and regulatory bureaucracy as public policy instruments? There are 
others; why are they not used more often? 
Augmenting the Standard Analysis: Bilateral Exchange 
Niskanen begins with the standard analysis, but appends to it a second 
major consideration.15 Not only is a bureaucrat's personal remuneration not 
directly linked to the benefit-cost ratio of his agency's programs and 
activities, in addition, a bureau's revenues are similarly unlinked. The 
typical government bureau receives a large part if not all of its revenues in 
the form of an appropriation or grant from the legislature. Thus, bureaus and 
their political sponsors engage in a bilateral exchange relationship. The 
sponsor is not satisfied with the private market outcome else there would be 
no program. The agency is prepared to design and administer a program -- for 
a price. The sponsor wishes to buy cheap, the agency wishes to sell dear, and 
the game begins. Various asynnnetries characterize the game. The bureau has 
much more accurate knowledge of its production function than the sponsor, and 
based on past experience can estimate what price the legislative market will 
bear. Thus, the typical bureau's position is that of a monopoly supplier with 
some degree of ability to exploit a passsive sponsor (e.g. Exhibit 2). 
Niskanen models this situation insightfully. His general conclusion is that 
the bilateral exchange between legisl ature and bureaucracy results in an 
oversupply of publicly-provided goods and services. 
Niskanen's seminal analysis has spawned a fairl y extensive literature, 
most of which has appeared in the journal, Public Choice. These derivative 
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analyses typically modify some part or another of the original structure of 
the model, and report specific conclusions somewhat different from those in 
the original. For our purposes, the basic finding of the model is what 
matters, and that finding is common to the many variations on the main theme. 
Even when we presume nothing in the way of internal bureaucratic dynamics, 
bureaucratic politics, the nature of bureaucratic personalities, or whatever, 
we still find an important variety of bureaucratic failure -- inefficient 
supply of public services -- which arises purely from the interaction between 
bureaucratic and legislative institutions. The finding is simple, stark, and 
discouraging. 
The Political Science View: Trilateral Exchange 
The literature stimulated by Niskanen's work is almost completely 
theoretical. Part of the reason for its generally positive reception lies in 
the existence of an extensive empi�ical literature in political science which 
is consistent with the outlines of Niskanen's conclusions. As mentioned 
earlier, the political science literature on bureaucracy draws heavily from 
sociological formulations which emphasize organizational dynamics and 
bureaucratic politics. But there is another large literature which treats the 
bureaucracy as a component of larger policy processes, a literature which 
contains numerous case studies consistent with, though more complex than the 
simple model of bilateral exchange. The central concept in this latter 
literature is that of the ''policy subsystem," also called ''subgovernment, '' 
or ''iron triangle.'' The three elements of such triangles are a government 
bureau, its constituency (i.e. the ''consumers'' of its services or 
activities), and the congressional committees or subcommittees with 
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jurisdiction ove� the bureau.16 These three components of a policy subsystem
engage in trilateral exchange: Congressmen nurture the bureau, the bureau 
services its constituencies, and the constituencies provide political support 
for the congressmen.17 Much of this literature focuses on public policy 
failure, but given the perspective just advanced, such failures are not hung 
solely on the bureaucracy. In fact, upon considering the legally subordinate 
position of the bureaucracy and the politically supplicant position of the 
bureau's constituency, the ''subgovernment'' literature attributes a large 
part of policy failure to the Congress. 
After reading accounts like those presented in Exhibits (1) to (6) the 
outraged citizen asks ''Why doesn't Congress do something besides publicize 
and recommend!'' The student of Congress replies ''Because there's no such 
thing as Congress; there are only two Houses, four party caucuses, 300 odd 
committees and subcommittees, and ultimately 535 members. Congress generally 
does little besides investigate and recommend because in the end one 
congressman's bureaucratic failure comes too close to another Congressman's 
bread and butter. That this argument should need further repeating at this 
stage in our history continually surprises me, but evidence to the contrary 
abounds, so let us consider it one more time. 
Representatives and Senators are elected from geographically defined 
districts which only by chance are microcosms of the nation as a whole. Our 
representatives are no worse than the rest of us, but no better either. Thus, 
they regard themselves as principally responsible to those who control their 
personal fates, namely subgroups in their geographically defined districts. 
Congressmen comprehend the national interest only when it is translated into 
local dialects. 
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As David Mayhew has persuasively argued, the complicated formal and 
informal structure of Congress facilitates the typical member's efforts to 
please his district and thus win re-election.18 For our purposes the most 
important element of the congressional structure is the committee system and 
the practices which surround it. In a society like ours there is much to be 
said for a division of labor. If members separate into small groups, 
specialize in a particular program area, and respect each other's areas of 
expertise, will we not get better law than if the entire Congress tries to 
participate on an equal footing in all policy areas? Certainly that is the 
belief underlying traditional justifications of the committee system and its 
supporting structure of informal norms like apprenticeship, specialization, 
and reciprocity.19 The justification would be more persuasive if congressmen 
were elected at large, or if committees were selected randomly from the 
membership ot the full body. In either case there would be little reason to 
believe that small specialized committees would make decisions greatly 
different from those the entire chamber would make if equally well-informed.20
Obviously, however, such conditions do not hold • .  Not only does each 
member have a locally-colored perception of the national interest, but the 
connnittee assignment process generally allows members to join those committees 
whose subject matter is of greatest interest (i.e. political importance) to 
them.21 If these ''interested'' members then develop programs and oversee 
agencies in a relatively autonomous fashion, should we really expect a 
government which unequivocally serves the general interest? Or should we 
expect a government which generously subsidizes commercial agriculture, the 
Teamsters, government employees, defense contractors, or whatever one's 
favorite special interest? The relevant committee may be well aware that 
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money is being wasted, but at least its being wasted _Q.y their people, on their 
people. Cynical? Think about it. 
Are we to believe that the purportedly expert Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee (Exhibit 2) really was unaware of the submerged 
iceberg of HSS payroll? (If so, why? ) Is it unduly cynical to suggest that 
the distinguished chairman tacitly approved a means of evading employment 
ceilings imposed by his colleagues? 
Are we to believe that EPA promulgated regulations (Exhibit 5) which 
were really beyond its Congressional overseers' wildest dreams? Is it not 
likely that the Democratic members of the Senate Environment and Public Works 
cot1Dnittee had a broader concept of ''jeopardy to health and welfare'' than 
does Mr. Kilpatrick? 
Are we to believe that members of the Conunerce Conunittees and the 
relevant Appropriations subcot1Dnittees really were unaware of the economic 
impact of ICC regulation of the trucking industry (Exhibit 6)? Is it unduly 
cynical to agree with Mayhew that ''· · ·  there is every reason to believe that 
the regulatory agencies do what Congress wants them to do." 22
Even when an agency clearly does violate the intent of its 
congressional masters, the reactions are illuminating. In Exhibit 3 ,  for 
example, it sounds as if Representntiv� Spellman, who then chaired the 
Compensation and Employee Benefits Subcommittee of the Post Off ice and Civil 
Service Committee, might go howling for bureaucratic scalps. Not so. The 
article goes on to report that Representative Spellman, a vigorous defender of 
federal employees favored elimination of the federal pay cap, rather than 
enforcement: ''I think it's a silly way to deal with the problem." 
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In the end, many of our bureaucratic failures seem to have a large 
element of congressional failure underlying them. Wasteful, deceptive, 
disingenuous, paternalistic, and captive bureaucrats work in harmony with 
wasteful, deceptive, disingenuous, paternalistic and captive congressmen. To 
a considerable extent the former reflect the latter. The bureaucrats catch a 
disproportionate share of the public relations flak, while the congressmen 
appropriate a disproportionate share of the political credit, in return for 
which they shelter the bureaucrats. Various special interests provide the 
motive force and are paid handsomely for their labors, but the more general 
interests of American citizens get short shrift under such a system. 
STRUCTURAL REFORM AS A CURE FOR BUREAUCRATIC(? ) FAILURE 
Political science professors are by nature cautious about structural 
reform. To some extent their caution reflects knowledge of numerous reforms 
whose unintended and unanticipat�d consequences were fully as bad as the 
objects of reforms. And to some extent their caution simply reflects the old 
saw, '�If it ain't broke, don't fix it. '' Why dissipate resources on 
structural reform campaigns which will not solve the targeted problems even if 
successful? Reformers should recognize that the day to day processes of the 
government reflect equilibria of political forces. If all the politically 
significant actors in a given program or policy area are reasonably happy with 
the state of that area, then structural reform is not likely to succeed, and 
if it does, it is not likely to make much difference. There simply are not 
that many cases of devilishly deceptive bureaucrats pulling the wool over 
congressional eyes, though some congressmen would like us to believe that. 
There are, however, many cases where congressmen voluntarily don wool 
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blinders. 
The brutal fact is that only a small minority of our 535 congressmen 
would trade the present bureaucratic structure for one which was an efficient, 
effective agent of the general interest -- the political payoffs of the latter 
are lower than those of the former. Congressional talk of inefficient, 
irresponsible, out-of-control bureaucracy is typically just that -- talk 
and when it isn't, it usually refers to agencies under the jurisdiction of 
other congressmen's committees.23 Why do reformers continually ignore the 
fact that Congress has all the power necessary to enforce the ''people's 
will'' on the bureaucracy? The Congress can abolish or reorganize an agency. 
The Congress can limit or expand an agency's jurisdiction, or allow its 
authority to lapse entirely. The Congress can slash an agency's 
appropriations. The Congress can investigate. The Congress can do all of 
these things, but individual congredamen generally find reasons not to do so. 
Congressmen themselves are increasingly aware of the contradictions 
between their individual interests and their constitutional responsibilities. 
Not surprisingly, structural reform in Congress itself has been their 
preferred solution. In an attempt to increase Congressional oversight of the 
bureaucracy special oversight subcommittees have been established, but while 
the sheer volume of oversight activity has increased (why be a subcommittee 
chairman if you don't hold a hearing now and them), we await research showing 
that the quality or effectiveness of the oversight has improved. Skepticism 
is justified because the structural reform does not touch the problem Seymour 
Scher identified long ago: insufficient incentives to oversee in the 
systematic way desired by reformers.24 Not only are other uses of 
congressional time more politically profitable, but as Scher points out, 
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oversight can be dangerous. A subcommittee might blunder onto a smoothly 
functioning subgovernment and thereby provoke the ire of colleagues and 
interest groups. And, of course, in one's own bailiwick congressmen feel that 
oversight can best be done in an informal, personal, and confidential manner. 
Another structural reform which has attracted much attention in 
Congress is the class of proposals labeled ''sunset." Recent reports 
indicate that this is an idea whose time has come and gone. Even so, notice 
that sunset is an attempt to force Congress to exercise powers it already has. 
If Congressmen had any compelling incentive to scrutinize the operations of 
agencies and the impacts of programs, they would do so without sunset and/or 
special oversight subcommittees. The incentive is not there, and sunset will 
not change that. 
I hesitate to conclude with an uninterrupted stream of negative 
judgments about structural reform. But I am equally hesitant to offer 
suggestions about structural reforms which would make a difference, for these 
are so radical as to horrify the average citizen. To have an impact a 
structural reform must change incentives. What kind of reform, then, would 
change the incentives which underlie the congressional-bureaucratic failures I 
have discussed? The most obvious one would involve a change in the electoral 
system. Proportional representation would break the link between geographic 
district and congressmen, and thus allow the latter to hear the general 
interest a bit more clearly. So would single-member district elections with 
districts composed of randomly-selected social security numbers rather than 
geographic areas. One can say a great deal for and against such proposals, 
but in view of their total infeasibility, let's not bother. 
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Another structural reform would establish closer ties between the 
electoral fates of individual congressmen and the public's perception of the 
collective performance of the Congress (and the Administration when 
applicable). At one time political party loyalty (in the electorate) and 
cohesion (in the government) did this, but in the contemporary U.S. the 
typical congressman answers for no one's performance or record but his own, 
the 198:> election notwithstanding.25 An institutional means of recreating 
this broken link has recently been bUggested by Lloyd Cutler.26 He proposes 
that the election laws be changed to require the citizenry to choose between 
candidate packages which include president, vice-president, and House 
candidates. Of course, the Senate remains untouchable, and Cutler's proposal 
is no more feasible than those mentioned above. 
Creative intellects can propose structural reforms from now to 
doomsday, but those reforms which would significantly change the incentives 
facing congressmen and bureaucrats will stand little chance of adoption, even 
if political analysts can marshal no major negative arguments against them. 27
The political forces underlying existing equilibria will understandably block 
any structural reform capable of destroying these equilibria. Unfortunately, 
such equilibria arise from fundamental features of our constitutional system; 
ony structural reforms aimed at that level can make much of a difference. 
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Press, rev. ed.), 1980. 
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27. The most imaginative proposed reform I have heard lately is the 
suggestion of Baden and Fort that a ''bureaucratic predator'' be allowed 
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and as a reward for its hunting would receive a portion of the useless 
expenditures it discovered. The proposal is delightful, but congressmen 
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